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Two-Factor Data Security Protection Mechanism
for Cloud Storage System
Joseph K. Liu, Kaitai Liang∗, Willy Susilo, Jianghua Liu, Yang Xiang
Abstract—In this paper, we propose a two-factor data security protection mechanism with factor revocability for cloud storage system.
Our system allows a sender to send an encrypted message to a receiver through a cloud storage server. The sender only needs to know
the identity of the receiver but no other information (such as its public key or its certificate). The receiver needs to possess two things
in order to decrypt the ciphertext. The first thing is his/her secret key stored in the computer. The second thing is a unique personal
security device which connects to the computer. It is impossible to decrypt the ciphertext without either piece. More importantly, once
the security device is stolen or lost, this device is revoked. It cannot be used to decrypt any ciphertext. This can be done by the cloud
server which will immediately execute some algorithms to change the existing ciphertext to be un-decryptable by this device. This
process is completely transparent to the sender. Furthermore, the cloud server cannot decrypt any ciphertext at any time. The security
and efficiency analysis show that our system is not only secure but also practical.
Keywords—two-factor, factor revocability, security, cloud storage.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Cloud storage [44], [43], [49], [45], [10] is a model of
networked storage system where data is stored in pools
of storage which are generally hosted by third parties.
There are many benefits to use cloud storage. The most
notable is data accessibility. Data stored in the cloud can
be accessed at any time from any place as long as there
is network access. Storage maintenance tasks, such as
purchasing additional storage capacity, can be offloaded
to the responsibility of a service provider. Another ad-
vantage of cloud storage is data sharing between users.
If Alice wants to share a piece of data (e.g. a video) to
Bob, it may be difficult for her to send it by email due to
the size of data. Instead, Alice uploads the file to a cloud
storage system so that Bob can download it at anytime.
Despite its advantages, outsourcing data storage also
increases the attack surface area at the same time. For
example, when data is distributed, the more locations
it is stored the higher risk it contains for unauthorized
physical access to the data. By sharing storage and net-
works with many other users it is also possible for other
unauthorized users to access your data. This may be
due to mistaken actions, faulty equipment, or sometimes
because of criminal intent. A promising solution to offset
the risk is to deploy encryption technology. Encryption
can protect data as it is being transmitted to and from
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the cloud service. It can further protect data that is stored
at the service provider. Even there is an unauthorized
adversary who has gained access to the cloud, as the
data has been encrypted, the adversary cannot get any
information about the plaintext. Asymmetric encryption
allows the encryptor to use only the public information
(e.g. public key or identity of the receiver) to generate
a ciphertext while the receiver uses his/her own secret
key to decrypt. This is the most convenient mode of
encryption for data transition, due to the elimination of
key management existed in symmetric encryption.
ENHANCED SECURITY PROTECTION. In a normal asym-
metric encryption, there is a single secret key corre-
sponding to a public key or an identity. The decryp-
tion of ciphertext only requires this key. The key is
usually stored inside either a personal computer or a
trusted server, and may be protected by a password. The
security protection is sufficient if the computer/server
is isolated from an opening network. Unfortunately,
this is not what happens in the real life. When being
connected with the world through the Internet, the
computer/server may suffer from a potential risk that
hackers may intrude into it to compromise the secret
key without letting the key owner know. In the physical
security aspect, the computer storing a user decryption
key may be used by another user when the original
computer user (i.e. the key owner) is away (e.g. when
the user goes to toilet for a while without locking the
machine). In an enterprise or college, the sharing usage
of computers is also common. For example, in a college,
a public computer in a copier room will be shared with
all students staying at the same floor. In these cases,
the secret key can be compromised by some attackers
who can access the victim’s personal data stored in the
cloud system. Therefore, there exists a need to enhance
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the security protection.
An analogy is e-banking security. Many e-banking
applications require a user to use both a password and a
security device (two factors) to login system for money
transfer. The security device may display a one-time
password to let the user type it into the system, or it may
be needed to connect with the computer (e.g. through
USB or NFC). The purpose of using two factors is to
enhance the security protection for the access control.
As cloud computing becomes more mature and there
will be more applications and storage services provided
by the cloud, it is easy to foresee that the security for data
protection in the cloud should be further enhanced [47],
[42], [12], [18]. They will become more sensitive and
important, as if the e-banking analogy. Actually, we have
noticed that the concept of two-factor encryption, which
is one of the encryption trends for data protection1, has
been spread into some real-world applications, for exam-
ple, full disk encryption with Ubuntu system, AT&T two
factor encryption for Smartphones2, electronic vaulting
and druva - cloud-based data encryption3. However,
these applications suffer from a potential risk about
factor revocability that may limit their practicability.
Note we will explain it later. A flexible and scalable two-
factor encryption mechanism is really desirable in the era
of cloud computing. That motivates our work.
1.1 Some Naive Approaches
We discuss some naive approaches for enhancement of
security protection and explain why they are not the best
candidate to achieve the goal of flexibility.
1) Double encryption: A security device (with an
additional public key or serial number) is still re-
quired. The encryption process is executed twice.
First encrypt the plaintext corresponding to the
public key or identity of the user. Then encrypt
it again corresponding to the public key or serial
number of the security device. For the decryption
stage, the security device first decrypts once. The
partially decrypted ciphertext is then passed to the
computer which uses the user secret key to further
decrypt it. Without either part (user secret key or
security device) one cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
It seems that this naive approach can achieve our
goal. However, there exist many practical issues that
it cannot solve. For example,
• If the user has lost his security device, then
his/her corresponding ciphertext in the cloud
cannot be decrypted forever! That is, the ap-
proach cannot support security device up-
date/revocability.
1. http://www.datamation.com/data-center/trends-in-data-
protection-prevention-and-recovery.html
2. http://www.securityweek.com/att-offer-carrier-provided-two-
factor-encryption-smartphones
3. http://www.druva.com/
• The sender needs to know the serial number /
public key of the security device, in additional
to the user’s identity / public key. That makes
the encryption process more complicated. In the
case of identity-based encryption, the concept
of “identity-based” has been totally lost as the
sender needs to know not only the identity but
another serial number!
2) Split the secret key into two parts: Another naive
way to think of is to simply split the secret key into
two parts. The first part is stored in the computer
while the second part is embedded into a security
device. Similar to the above approach, without ei-
ther part one cannot decrypt the ciphertext.
Again it seems that this approach can achieve our
goal. However, note that the security of a normal
encryption scheme cannot be guaranteed if part of
the secret key has been exposed. The security is only
guaranteed if the whole secret key has not been ex-
posed to the adversary. In other words, if we simply
split the secret key into two parts, the adversary
with either part may have non-negligible chance to
decrypt (or at least to know some information about
the plaintext). This is not the case that we expect.
There exists another cryptographic primitive
called “leakage-resilient encryption” [1], [37], [15].
The security of the scheme is still guaranteed if
the leakage of the secret key is up to certain bits
such that the knowledge of these bits does not help
to recover the whole secret key. However, though
using leakage resilient primitive can safeguard the
leakage of certain bits, there exists another practical
limitation. Suppose we put part of the secret key
into the security device. Unfortunately the device
is stolen. The user needs to obtain a replacement
device so that he can continue to decrypt his corre-
sponding secret key. The trivial way is to copy the
same bits (as in the stolen device) to the new device
by the private key generator (PKG). This approach
can be easily achieved. Nevertheless, there exists
security risk. If the adversary (who has stolen the
security device) can also break into the computer
where the other part of secret key is stored, then
it can decrypt all ciphertext corresponding to the
victim user. The most secure way is to cease the
validity of the stolen security device.
The same analogy is the online banking. A
user needs to have a security device (together with
the knowledge of his/her password) in order to
login the e-banking service. If the security device
is reported as lost, the user can no longer use the
old device to login. Thus using leakage resilient
primitive cannot provide this security feature which
is considered as the most important criterion of two-
factor security protection.
3) Other methods: Some real-world systems, such
as AT&T and druva, also leverage two-factor en-
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cryption techniques to protect message from being
leaked to malicious users. However, their techniques
suffer from a potential practical risk. Below we take
druva system as an example. In a druva system, a
message is first encrypted under a user key k1, and
next uploaded to a cloud server. The user key k1
is further encrypted by another user key k2, and
stored in the server as well. The key k2 is held by the
user. When retrieving the message, the user needs
to use k2 to recover k1 which is further used to
recover m. It is undeniable that this message-key-
encrypt mechanism is much better than the mode
only using a single key to encrypt an outsourced
data, and storing the ciphertext along with the key
in the server. Nevertheless, this mechanism suffers
from a potential risk in practice (which we have
mentioned previously): once the user loses the key
k2, all data of the user stored in the cloud cannot
be retrieved. The lack of revocability for encryption
factor limits the flexibility of the system.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a novel two-factor security
protection mechanism for data stored in the cloud. Our
mechanism provides the following nice features:
1) Our system is an IBE (Identity-based encryption)-
based mechanism. That is, the sender only needs
to know the identity of the receiver in order to
send an encrypted data (ciphertext) to him/her. No
other information of the receiver (e.g. public key,
certificate etc.) is required. Then the sender sends
the ciphertext to the cloud where the receiver can
download it at anytime.
2) Our system provides two-factor data encryption
protection. In order to decrypt the data stored in the
cloud, the user needs to possess two things. First,
the user needs to have his/her secret key which
is stored in the computer. Second, the user needs
to have a unique personal security device which
will be used to connect to the computer (e.g. USB,
Bluetooth and NFC). It is impossible to decrypt the
ciphertext without either piece.
3) More importantly, our system, for the first time,
provides security device (one of the factors) revoca-
bility. Once the security device is stolen or reported
as lost, this device is revoked. That is, using this
device can no longer decrypt any ciphertext (cor-
responding to the user) in any circumstance. The
cloud will immediately execute some algorithms to
change the existing ciphertext to be un-decryptable
by this device. While the user needs to use his
new / replacement device (together with his secret
key) to decrypt his/her ciphertext. This process is
completely transparent to the sender.
4) The cloud server cannot decrypt any ciphertext at
any time.
We provide an estimation of the running time of our
prototype to show its practicality, using some benchmark
results. We also note that although there exist some
naive approaches that seem to achieve our goal, we have
discussed in Section 1.1 that there are many limitations
by each of them and thus we believe our mechanism is
the first to achieve all the above mentioned features in
the literature.
2 RELATED WORK
We first review some solutions which may contain sim-
ilar functionalities. We will further explain why they
cannot fully achieve our goal.
2.1 Cryptosystems with Two Secret Keys
There are two kinds of cryptosystems that requires two
secret keys for decryption. They are certificateless cryp-
tosystem and certificate-based cryptosystem.
Certificateless cryptosystem (CLC) was first intro-
duced in [2] and further improvements can be found
in [4], [28], [23]. It combines the merits of identity-
based cryptosystem (IBC) and the traditional public-key
infrastructure (PKI). In a CLC, a user with an identity
chooses his own user secret key and user public key.
At the same time the authority (called the Key Gener-
ation Centre (KGC)) further generates a partial secret
key according to his identity. Encryption or signature
verification requires the knowledge of both the public
key and the user identity. On the opposite, decryption
or signature generation requires the knowledge of both
the user secret key and the partial secret key given by
the KGC. Different from the traditional PKI, there is no
certificate required. Thus the costly certificate validation
process can be eliminated. However, the encryptor or
the signature verifier still needs to know the user public
key. It is less convenient than IBC where only identity is
required for encryption or signature verification.
Similar to CLC, another primitive called certificate-
based cryptosystem (CBC) was introduced in [19]. Fur-
ther variants may include [3], [29], [33], [30], [31]. The
concept is almost the same as CLC, except that the
partial secret key given by the KGC (which is called the
certificate) is a signature of the identity and the public key
of the user by the KGC. (Note that in CLC, the partial
secret key given by the KGC is just the signature of the
identity of the user.) Due to the similarities, CBC faces
the same disadvantages as CLC mentioned above.
2.2 Cryptosystems with Online Authority
Mediated cryptography was first introduced in [7] for
the purpose of revocation of public keys. It requires an
online mediator, referred to a SEM (SEcurity Mediator),
for every transaction. The SEM also provides a control
of security capabilities. If the SEM does not cooperate
then no transactions with the public key are possible any
longer. In other words, any revoked user cannot get the
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cooperation from the SEM. That means revoked users
cannot decrypt any ciphertext successfully.
Later on, this notion was further generalized as se-
curity mediated certificateless (SMC) cryptography [11],
[48]. In a SMC system, a user has a secret key, public
key and an identity. The user secret key and the SEM
are required to decrypt a ciphertext or sign a message.
On the opposite side, the user public key and the corre-
sponding identity are needed for signature verification
or encryption. Since the SEM is controlled by the revo-
cation authority, the authority can refuse to provide any
cooperation for revoked user so that no revoked user can
generate signature or decrypt ciphertext.
Note that SMC is different from our concept. The main
purpose of SMC is to solve the revocation problem. Thus
the SME is controlled by the authority and it has to be
online for every signature signing and ciphertext decryp-
tion. Furthermore, it is not identity-based. The encryptor
(or signature verifier) needs to know the corresponding
public key in addition to the identity. That makes the
system less practical and looses the advantages of using
identity-based system.
2.3 Cryptosystem with Security Device
The paradigm of key-insulated cryptography was in-
troduced in [16] and variants were proposed in
[17], [22], [25], [32]. There is a physically-secure but
computationally-limited device in the system. A long-
term key is stored in this device, while a short-term
secret key is kept by users on a powerful but insecure
device where cryptographic computations take place.
Short term secrets are then refreshed at discrete time
periods via interaction between the user and the base
while the public key remains unchanged throughout the
lifetime of the system. The user obtains a partial secret
key from the device at the beginning of each time period.
He then combines this partial secret key with the one
from the previous period, in order to renew the secret
key for the current time period.
Different from our concept, key-insulated cryptosys-
tem requires all users to update their key in every time
period. It may require some costly time synchronization
algorithms between users which may not be practical
in many scenarios. The key update process requires the
security device. Once the key has been updated, the
signing or decryption algorithm does not require the
device anymore within the same time period. While our
concept does require the security device every time the
user tries to decrypt the ciphertext. Furthermore, there is
no key updating required in our system. Thus we do not
require any synchronization within the whole system.
2.4 Cryptosystem with Revocability
Since our system is an IBE-based mechanism, we be-
low introduce IBE-based systems supporting revoca-
bility. The first revocable IBE is proposed by Boneh
and Franklin [8], in which a ciphertext is encrypted
under an identity id and a time period T , and a non-
revoked user is issued a private key skid,T by a PKG
such that the user can access the data in T . Boldyreva,
Goyal and Kumar [6] proposed the security notion for
revocable IBE. To achieve adaptive security, Libert and
Vergnaud [26] proposed a revocable IBE scheme based
on the combination of attribute-based encryption and
IBE. Recently, Seo and Emura [39] formalized a revised
notion for revocable IBE. Since its introduction, there
are many variants of revocable IBE, such as [38]. The
premise of a revocable IBE system is mainly related to a
time period: next the decryption rights of the next time
period relies on a secret token (for the next time period)
issued by PKG and a current time period key. However,
this premise yields inconvenience once the current time
period key is lost.
Another cryptosystem supporting revocability is
proxy re-encryption (PRE). Decryption rights delegation
is introduced in [35]. Blaze, Bleumer and Strauss [5]
formally defined the notion of PRE. To employ PRE in
the IBE setting, Green and Ateniese [20] defined the
notion of identity-based PRE (IB-PRE). Later on, Tang,
Hartel and Jonker [41] proposed a CPA-secure IB-PRE
scheme, in which delegator and delegatee can belong
to different domains. After that there are many IB-PRE
systems have been proposed to support different user
requirements, e.g., [13], [36], [34], [40], [24]. Among of
the previously introduced IB-PRE systems, [20] is the
most efficient one without loss of revocability. We state
that leveraging [20] can only achieve one of our design
goals, revocability, but not two-factor protection.
3 OVERVIEW
3.1 Our Intuition
Inspired by [21], we propose a two-factor data security
protection mechanism. Before giving the description of
our mechanism, we first give an intuition on it. In our
system, we have the following entities:
• Private Key Generator (PKG): It is a trusted party
responsible for issuing private key of every user.
• Security Device Issuer (SDI): It is a trusted party
responsible for issuing security device of every user.
• Sender (Alice): She is the sender (and the creator)
of the ciphertext. She only knows the identity (e.g.
email address) of the receiver but nothing else
related to the receiver. After she has created the
ciphertext, she sends to the cloud server to let the
receiver for download.
• Receiver (Bob): He is the receiver of the ciphertext
and has a unique identity (e.g. email address). The
ciphertext is stored on a cloud storage while he can
download it for decryption. He has a private key
(stored in his computer) and a security device (that
contains some secret information related to his iden-
tity). They are given by the PKG. The decryption
of ciphertext requires both the private key and the
security device.
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• Cloud Server: The cloud server is responsible for
storing all ciphertext (for receiver to download).
Once a user has reported lost of his security device
(and has obtained a new one from the PKG), the
cloud acts as a proxy to re-encrypt all his past and
future ciphertext corresponding to the new device.
That is, the old device is revoked.
We further illustrate our mechanism’s framework in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. When a new system user, say Bob,
joins our system, a PKG will issue a private key, and
SDI will issue a security device to him. Both the private
key and the security device are necessary for recovering
a data from its encrypted format.
In ordinary data sharing, a data sender, say Alice, first
encrypts the sharing data under the identity of a data
receiver, say Bob, and next uploads the ciphertext to the
cloud server. Here we refer to this ciphertext as first-
level ciphertext. After receiving the first-level ciphertext
from Alice, the cloud server then turns the ciphertext to
become a second-level ciphertext for the corresponding
security device belonging to Bob. Bob then downloads
the second-level ciphertext from the cloud, and next
recovers the data from its encrypted form by using his
private key and security device.
When the security device of Bob is either lost or stolen,
Bob first reports the issue to the SDI. The SDI then
issues a new security device to Bob, and meanwhile,
it sends a request of updating Bob’s corresponding ci-
phertext along with a special key to the cloud server.
The cloud server updates the ciphertexts of Bob under
an old security device to the ones under a new device.
However, it does not gain access to the underlying data
in the update process. Here Bob is allowed to download
and recover the data by using his private key and new
security device.
3.2 Assumptions
In our system, we assume that the PKG is a trusted
party4. We further assume that the SDI is trusted, and
the cloud service is semi-trust. That is, it is honest that
it will execute all prescribed algorithms but it is curious.
It may try to decrypt the ciphertext stored in the cloud
storage. We also assume that an honest system user will
not expose his/her security device and secret key to an
adversary, and the security device is temper resistant.
3.3 Threat Model
In this paper, we consider the following threats:
1) Type-I: Decrypt without security device: The ad-
versary tries to decrypt the ciphertext without the
security device, or using a revoked security device,
or using another security device belonging to others.
It can have its own secret key.
4. This is a normal assumption in all identity-based systems.
2) Type-II: Decrypt without secret key: The adversary
tries to decrypt the ciphertext without any secret
key. It can have its own security device.
Note that the above threat model has already captured
the semi-trust behaviour of the cloud server.
3.4 Notations
We introduce the notations used in our system below.
TABLE 1: Frequently Used Notations
Z∗q all positive integers (except 0) after module a prime q
⊕ exclusive OR
r ∈R Z∗q randomly choose an r from Z∗q
{0, 1} a bit with value either 0 or 1
A||B string A concatenates string B
IDi the identity of user i
tpki the public information of the (old) security device
of a user IDi
tski the secret information embedded in the (old) security
device of a user IDi
t̃pki the public information of the new security device
of a user IDi
skIDi the secret key of a user IDi
m a message
C1 the first-level ciphertext of a message m
C2 the second-level ciphertext of a message m
rk
tpki→t̃pki
the information used to update a second-level
ciphertext under an old security device to another
(second-level) ciphertext under a new security device
C
(up)
2 the updated second-level ciphertext of a message m
under a new security device
4 DETAILS OF OUR PROPOSED MECHANISM
4.1 Mathematical Preliminaries
Bilinear Maps. Let BSetup denote an algorithm that, on
input the security parameter k, outputs the parameters
for a bilinear map as (q, g,G,GT , e), where G and GT are
two multiplicative cyclic groups with prime order q ∈
Θ(2k) and g is a generator of G. The efficient mapping
e : G × G → GT has three properties: (1) Bilinearity: for
all g ∈ G and a, b ∈R Z∗q , e(ga, gb) = e(g, g)ab; (2) Non-
degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1GT , where 1GT is the unit of GT ;
(3) Computability: e can be efficiently computed.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (BDH) Assump-
tion [46]. For an algorithm A, define its advantage
as AdvBDHA (k) = |Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)abc) = 1] −
Pr[A(g, ga, gb, gc, e(g, g)z) = 1]|, where a, b, c, z ∈R Z∗q .
We say the BDH assumption holds, if for any PPT
algorithm A, AdvBDHA (k) is negligible in k.
q-weak Decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Inversion (q-wDBDHI) Assumption. For
an algorithm A, define its advantage as
Advq−wDBDHIA (k) = |Pr[A(g, ga, ..., ga
q
, gb, e(g, g)b/a) =
1] − Pr[A(g, ga, ..., gaq , gb, e(g, g)z) = 1]|, where
a, b, z ∈R Z∗q . We say the q-wDBDHI asummption
holds, if for any PPT algorithm A, Advq−wDBDHIA (k) is
negligible in k. In our proof, we set q = 1, that is, the
1-wDBDHI assumption [27].
Target Collision Resistant Hash Function [14]. A TCR
hash function H guarantees that given a random element
6
Fig. 1: Ordinary Data Sharing.
Fig. 2: Update Ciphertext after Issuing A New Security Device.
x which is from the valid domain of H , a PPT adversary
A cannot find y 6= x such that H(x) = H(y). We let
AdvTCRH,A = Pr[(x, y) ← A(1k) : H(x) = H(y), x 6=
y, x, y ∈ DH] be the advantage of A in successfully
finding collisions from a TCR hash function H , where
DH is the valid input domain of H , and k is the security
parameter. If a hash function is chosen from a TCR hash
function family, AdvTCRH,A is negligible.
4.2 Our Construction
Construction Roadmap. We leverage two different encryp-
tion technologies: one is IBE and the other is traditional
Public Key Encryption (PKE). We first allow a user to
generate a first level ciphertext under a receiver’s iden-
tity. The first-level ciphertext will be further transformed
into a second level ciphertext corresponding to a security
device. The resulting ciphertext can be decrypted by a
valid receiver with secret key and security device. Here,
one might doubt that our construction is a trivial and
straightforward combination of two different encryp-
tions. Unfortunately, this is not true due to the fact that
we need to further support security device revocability.
A trivial combination of IBE and PKE cannot achieve our
goal. To support revocability, we employ re-encryption
technology such that the part of ciphertext for an old
security device can be updated for a new device if the
old device is revoked. Meanwhile, we need to generate
a special key for the above ciphertext conversion. We
also guarantee that the cloud server cannot achieve any
knowledge of message by accessing the special key, the
old ciphertext and the updated ciphertext. We further
use hash-signature method to “sign” ciphertext such
that once an component of ciphertext is tempered by
adversary, the cloud and ciphertext receiver can tell.
From the above presentations, we can see that our two-
factor protection system with security device revocability
cannot be obtained by trivially combining an IBE with a
PKE. We present the system description as follows.
1) Setup Phase: the setup phase generates all public
parameters and master secret key used throughout
the execution of system. The public parameters are
shared with all parties participating into the system
7
(including data sender/receiver, cloud server and a
PKG), while the master secret key is given to the
PKG. The details of setup phase are as follows.
a) Set G and GT to be groups of prime order q, and
e : G×G→ GT to be a bilinear map.
b) Choose g, g2, h ∈ G, α ∈R Z∗q , the target col-
lision resistant hash functions: H1 : G → Z∗q ,
H2 : {0, 1}2k → Z∗q , H3 : GT → {0, 1}2k, H4 :
{0, 1}∗ → G, H5 : {0, 1}∗ → G, and set g1 = gα,
where k is the security parameter as well as the
bit length of message.
c) Set the public parameters param to be (k, q, g, g1,
g2, h, e(g, g), e(g1, g2), H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, F (.)),
and the master secret key msk to be gα2 , where
F (ID) = u0 ·
∏
j∈V uj , u0, uj , ..., un ∈R G, and ID
is an n-bit string and V is the set of all j for which
the j-th bit of ID is equal to 1.
2) Key and Device Issued Phase: A SDI and a PKG
will respectively generate a security device and a
secret key for a registered user IDi in secure channel
such that the user can combine the security device
with the secret key to recover message from its
encrypted format. The details of key and security
device issued phase are as follows.
a) The SDI chooses zi,1, zi,2 ∈R Z∗q , and sets the
security device’s description information as tpki:
(tpki,1 = gzi,1 , tpki,2 = gzi,2 ), and its corre-
sponding secret information as tski: (tski,1 = zi,1,
tski,2 = zi,2). The SDI finally delivers the security
device to a user IDi.
b) The SDI stores the tuple (IDi, tpki) in a list List
shared with the cloud storage system.
c) The PKG sets the secret key for a user IDi as
skIDi = (skIDi,1, skIDi,2) = (g
α
2 F (IDi)
s, gs),
where s ∈R Z∗q .
3) First-Level Ciphertext Generation Phase: a data
sender encrypts a data under the identity of a data
receiver, and further sends the encrypted data to the
cloud server. Knowing public parameters param, a
data m ∈ {0, 1}k and a receiver’s identity IDi, a data
sender encrypts a data to a first level encryption as
follows. Note the first-level ciphertext generation is
built on top of Waters IBE [46].
a) Choose φ ∈R {0, 1}k, set t = H2(m,φ), compute
c1 = (m||φ)⊕H3(e(g1, g2)t), c2 = gt, c3 = F (IDi)t,
c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)
t.
b) Send the first-level ciphertext C1 = (c1, c2, c3, c4)
to the cloud server.
4) Second-Level ciphertext Phase: after receiving the
first-level ciphertext of a data from the data sender,
the cloud server generates the second-level cipher-
text. Knowing public parameters param, a first level
encryption for the user, and the information (IDi,
tpki) stored in List, the cloud server encrypts C1 =
(c1, c2, c3, c4) to a second-level ciphertext as follows.
a) Choose β1, β2 ∈R {0, 1}k, set r = H2(β1, β2), com-
pute c5 = c1⊕(β1||β2), c6 = (β1||β2)⊕H3(e(g, g)r),
c7 = (tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )r, c8 = hr, and c9 =
H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)
r.
b) Output the second-level ciphertext C2 = (c2, c3,
c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9) to the cloud.
5) Device Updated Phase: Once a device of a user
needs to be updated due to some incidences (e.g.
it is either lost or stolen), the user first reports the
issue to the SDI. The SDI then issues a new device
for the user.
a) The SDI chooses zi,1, zi,2 ∈R Z∗q , and sets the
security device’s description information as tpki:
(tpki,1 = gzi,1 , tpki,2 = gzi,2 ), and its corre-
sponding secret information as tski: (tski,1 = zi,1,
tski,2 = zi,2). The SDI finally delivers the security
device to a user IDi.
b) The SDI further updates the list List.
6) Ciphertext Updated Phase: The SDI notifies the
cloud server to update the ciphertext of the user by
sending a special piece of information.
a) The SDI first sends a piece of information to
the cloud server so as to inform the cloud to
execute the ciphertext updated process. The in-
formation rk
tpki→t̃pki
= (rk1, rk2, IDi, tpki, t̃pki)
is constructed as
rk1 = (t̃pki,1 · t̃pk
H1(t̃pki)
i,2 )
(δi,1+δi,2·H1(tpki))−1 · hξ,
rk2 = (tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )
ξ,
where ξ ∈R Z∗q , tski = (δi,1, δi,2) is the decryption
key of the old security device.
b) After receiving the information rktpki→tpkj , the
cloud server updates the ciphertext C2 as follows.
i) Parse C2 as (c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9), and
rktpki→tpkj as (rk1, rk2, IDi, tpki, tpkj).
ii) Check
e(c7, h) = e(tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 , c8),
e(c8, H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)) = e(h, c9).
(1)
If the equations do not hold, output ⊥; else
proceed.
iii) Compute c10 =
e(c7,rk1)
e(c8,rk2)
.
iv) Output an updated ciphertext C(up)2 = (c2, c3,
c4, c5, c6, c10). Note that although the number
of elements in the updated ciphertext is less
than that of the original ciphertext, the actual
size of the updated ciphertext is larger than
that of the original one. This can be seen in
our efficiency analysis in Table 4.
7) Data Recovery Phase. A data receiver uses a de-
cryption key and a device to recover the data as
follows.
a) If the ciphertext has not been updated, run as
• Parse C2 as (c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c7, c8, c9), skIDi
as (skIDi,1, skIDi,2) and tski as (tski,1, tski,2).
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• Security device computation phase: the device
intakes a component of the ciphertext c7, and
outputs the result θ = c
1
tski,1+tski,2·H1(tpki)
7 .
• Secret key decryption phase: given the partial
decryption result θ, the user uses his/her secret
key to recover the message as follows. Compute
e(g, g)r = e(g, θ) and c1 = c5⊕ c6⊕H3(e(g, g)r).
Further compute e(g1, g2)t =
e(c2,skIDi,1)
e(c3,skIDi,2)
, and
m||φ = c1 ⊕H3(e(g1, g2)t).
• If c2 = gH2(m,φ), c3 = F (IDi)H2(m,φ),
c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)
H2(m,φ), c7 = (tpki,1 ·
tpk
H1(tpki)
i,2 )
H2(β1,β2), c8 = hH2(β1,β2), and c9 =
H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)
H2(β1,β2), output m; otherwise,
output ⊥.
b) If the ciphertext has been updated, run as
• Parse C(up)2 as (c2, c3, c4, c5, c6, c10), skIDi as
(skIDi,1, skIDi,2) and tski as (tski,1, tski,2).
• Security device computation phase: the device
intakes a component of the ciphertext c10, and
outputs θ̂ = c
1
tski,1+tski,2·H1(tpki)
10 = e(g, g)
r.
• Secret key decryption phase: given the partial
decryption result θ̂, the user recovers m as in
the above secret key decryption phase, com-
puting c1 = c5 ⊕ c6 ⊕ H3(e(g, g)r), e(g1, g2)t =
e(c2,skIDi,1)
e(c3,skIDi,2)
, and m||φ = c1 ⊕H3(e(g1, g2)t).
4.3 Discussions
• Multiple revocability for device. Our construction
supports one-time device revocability that may
be not sufficient enough in practice. We here
show that the system can be extended to support
multiple revocability by leveraging the technique
introduced in [9]. We revise the rk
tpki→t̃pki
as
t̃ski,1+t̃ski,2H1(t̃pki)
tski,1+tski,2H1(tpki)
, and the ciphertext update com-
ponent c10 as c
rk
tpki→t̃pki
7 . The updated ciphertex is
identical to the original one except for c10 taking
place of c7. We note that c7 is not an input for H5
here. It is not difficult to see that a user can recover
the underlying message by using a updated security
device corresponding to t̃pki.
• Revocability for identity factor. It is possible to
extend our construction to support identity revo-
cability as well by leveraging the IBPRE technology
in [20]. We will leave this as a future work.
• Feasibility. Our system requires an SDI to issue a
security device to a user in the registration phase.
It is much like the case where a bank client is
issued a e-banking token when opening a bank
account. The device can be directly delivered to the
user by mail or in person. In practice, the security
device can be constructed from a USB token that is
extremely portable for users. Meanwhile, the user
also achieves a secret key given by a PKG. The secret
key can be stored in the user’s PC or clouds based
on the preference of the user.
The two-factor protection is necessary for high
valuable sensitive data, such as personal genome
information and company commercial secret. A user
may not always gain access to his PC. Suppose a
patient has to check his encrypted medical record
stored in a cloud storage system in a publicly used
computer. He may download his secret key as well
as an encrypted record to the local computer, and
next plug in a security device to unlock the record
with the secret key. This message recovery is almost
identical to the login operation of on-line banking
where user needs to use a login password along
with a security token (sometimes with a smart-
phone). Compared to a smart-phone, a USB token
is portable. After reading the record, the patient
can just plug out the device and leave. Since the
decryption depends on both the secret key and
the device, even the computer is corrupted by an
intruder, the intruder still cannot access the record.
We note that to date some information, such as
visit history, download history, may be easily leaked
from browser, the usage of security device combin-
ing with a secret key can double protect the secrecy
of information to a large extent.
5 SYSTEM EVALUATION
5.1 Security Analysis
We separate two security levels for our scheme: one is
allowing an adversary to achieve the secret key of user
but not the corresponding secure device, and the other
is the reversed case.
For Type-I Security. Here we allow an adversary to
obtain the secret key of a user but not the corresponding
security device. We analyze the security of our scheme
under the model of Type-I.
Practical Analysis: An adversary A now is given the
secret key skIDi of user IDi. We show that A can-
not recover the underlying message by only leveraging
knowledge of skIDi as follows.
Suppose there is a ciphertext C2 = (c2, c3, c4, c5, c6,
c7, c8, c9) for a user IDi, which is stored in the cloud
server, where c2 = gt, c3 = F (IDi)t, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t,
c5 = (m||φ) ⊕ H3(e(g1, g2)t) ⊕ (β1||β2), c6 = (β1||β2) ⊕
H3(e(g, g)
r), c7 = (tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )r, c8 = hr, and c9 =
H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)
r, t = H2(m,φ), r = H2(β1, β2). A can
compute
H3(
e(c2, skIDi,1)
e(c3, skIDi,2)
)⊕ c5
= H3(
e(gt, gα2 F (IDi)
s)
e(F (IDi)t, gs)
)⊕ c5
= H3(e(g1, g2)
t)⊕H3(e(g1, g2)t)⊕ (m||φ)⊕ (β1||β2)
= (m||φ)⊕ (β1||β2). (2)
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H3(e(g, c
1
tski,1+tski,2·H2(tpki)
7 ))
= H3(e(g, (tpki,1tpk
H1(tpki)
i,2 )
r
tski,1+tski,2H1(tpki) ))
= H3(e(g, g)
r). (3)
From E.q. (3), it can be seen that A can retrieve
H3(e(g, g)
r) (without given the security device) as long
as it can correctly guess the secret components tski,1 and
tski,2 simultaneously with probability 1q2 . Alternatively,
if A is able to correctly guess the output of H3 with
probability 1
22k
, then it can recover β1||β2 so as to gain
access to the message m.
Theoretical Analysis: If an adversary A recovers the
message by a given secret key, we can build an algorithm
B breaking the 1-wDBDHI assumption.
Setup Phase. B is given an instance of the 1-wDBDHI
problem, i.e. (g,A = ga, B = gb, T ), where T either is
random or is equal to e(g, g)
b
a . B chooses a F (.) as in
the real scheme, chooses α, ω ∈R Z∗q , sets y = A = ga,
and returns param = (k, q, g, g1 = gα, g2 = y, h = yω ,
e(g, g), e(g1, g2), H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, F (.)) to A. H1, H2,
H3, H4 and H5 are chosen as in the real scheme, and
meanwhile, they are random oracles controlled by B.
• H1 : On receipt of a tpki, if there exists a tuple (tpki,
ϕ1) in the list ListH1 , B returns ϕ1 to A. Otherwise,
B chooses a ϕ1 ∈R Z∗q , returns it to A, and adds
(tpki, ϕ1) to the list ListH1 .
• H2 : On receipt of a tuple (m, φ), if there exists a
tuple (m, φ, ϕ2) in the list ListH2 , B returns ϕ2 to
A. Otherwise, B chooses a ϕ2 ∈R Z∗q , returns it to
A, and adds (m, φ, ϕ2) to the list ListH2 .
• H3 : On receipt of a R ∈ GT , if there exists a tuple
(R, ξ) in the list ListH3 , B returns ξ to A. Otherwise,
B chooses a ξ ∈R {0, 1}2k, returns it to A, and adds
(R, ξ) to the list ListH3 .
• H4 : On receipt of a tuple (c1, c2, c3), if there exists a
tuple (c1, c2, c3, ϕ3) in the list ListH4 , B returns gϕ3
to A. Otherwise, B chooses a ϕ3 ∈R Z∗q , returns gϕ3
to A. B then adds (c1, c2, c3, ϕ3) to the list ListH4 .
• H5 : On receipt of a tuple (c5, c6, c7, c8), if there
exists a tuple (c5, c6, c7, c8, ϕ4) in the list ListH4 , B
returns gϕ4 (resp. gaϕ4 ) to A. Otherwise, if c5 = c∗5,
c6 = c
∗
6, c7 = c∗7, and c8 = c∗8, B chooses a ϕ4 ∈R Z∗q ,
and sets gaϕ4 for A; else it returns gϕ4 to A. B then
adds (c5, c6, c7, c8, ϕ4) to the list ListH5 .
Phase 1. A issues the following queries to B.
1) Security Device Queries. A issues an IDi to B
for querying its corresponding security device. B
chooses coini ∈ {0, 1} so that Pr[coini = 1] = ϑ
(ϑ will be determined later) and works as follows.
• If coini = 0, B aborts and outputs a random
bit b ∈ {0, 1}. B will add a tuple (IDi, tpki, ⊥,
coini = 0, zi,1, zi,2) to DeviceList, where tpki,1 =
yzi,1 , tpki,2 = yzi,2 and zi,1, zi,2 ∈R Z∗q .
• Otherwise, if there exists a tuple (IDi, tpki, tski,
coini = 1, zi,1, zi,2) in the list DeviceList, B
returns tski along with tpki to A; else, B chooses
zi,1, zi,2 ∈R Z∗q , sets tski = (zi,1, zi,2), tpki,1 =
gzi,1 and tpki,2 = gzi,2 . B then adds (IDi, tpki,
tski, coini = 1, zi,1, zi,2) to DeviceList, and
returns (tski, tpki) to A.
2) Secret Key Queries. A issues an IDi to B for query-
ing the secret key of IDi. B then checks whether
there exists a tuple (IDi, skIDi ) in SecretKeyList or
not. If yes, B returns skIDi ; else, B generates skIDi
as in the real scheme with knowledge of α and next
adds (IDi, skIDi ) to SecretKeyList.
3) Ciphertext Update Queries. A issues a tuple (C2,
tpki) to B for querying an update ciphertext C(up)2
under (IDi, t̃pki). B first checks whether there are
tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list ListH2 so that
c2 = g
t, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t, c7 = (tpki,1·tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )r,
c8 = h
r and c9 = H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)r. If no, output ⊥;
else proceed. B further recovers (IDi, tpki, ∗, coini,
zi,1, zi,2) from the list DeviceList.
• If coini = 1, B uses zi,1 and zi,2 to construct the
information rk
tpki→t̃pki
as in the real scheme.
B then computes C10 by using rktpki→t̃pki , and
outputs C(up)2 as in the real scheme.
• If coini = 0, and t̃pki is given to A, B outputs
⊥. Otherwise, B computes c10 = e(gr, t̃pki,1 ·
t̃pk
H1(t̃pki)
i,2 ), and next outputs (c2, c3, c4, c5, c6,
c10) as the updated ciphertext.
4) Data Recovery Queries. A issues a ciphertext to B.
B recovers the message as follows.
• For ciphertext C2, B first checks whether there
are tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list ListH2
so that c2 = gt, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t, c7 = (tpki,1 ·
tpk
H1(tpki)
i,2 )
r, c8 = hr and c9 = H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)r.
If no, B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B recovers tuples
(R1 = e(g1, g2)t, ξ1) and (R2 = e(g, g)r, ξ2) from
the list ListH3 , and computes m||φ = (c5⊕ (c6⊕
ξ2))⊕ ξ1.
• For ciphertext C(up)2 , B first checks whether
there are tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list
ListH2 so that c2 = gt, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t and
c10 = e(g
r, tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 ). If no, B outputs
⊥. Otherwise, B recovers tuples (R1 = e(g1, g2)t,
ξ1) and (R2 = e(g, g)r, ξ2) from the list ListH3 ,
and computes m||φ = (c5 ⊕ (c6 ⊕ ξ2))⊕ ξ1.
Challenge Phase. A outputs m0,m1 and (ID∗i , tpk∗i ).
B searches tpk∗i from the list DeviceList. If coin∗i = 1, B
aborts and outputs a b ∈ {0, 1}. Else, B proceeds.
• For original ciphertext, B chooses β∗1 , β∗2 , φ∗ ∈R
{0, 1}k, b ∈R {0, 1}, and t ∈R Z∗q . It issues e(g1, g2)t
to H3 to obtain ξ∗ and sets c∗1 = (mb||φ∗) ⊕ ξ∗,
c∗2 = g
t, c∗3 = F (ID∗i )
t. It then issues c∗1, c∗2, c∗3 to H4
to obtain ϕ∗3, and sets c∗4 = gtϕ
∗
3 . B further recovers
z∗i,1, z
∗
i,2 from DeviceList, issues tpk
∗
i to H1 to obtain
ϕ∗1, and sets c∗5 = c∗1⊕(β∗1 ||β∗2), c∗6 = (β∗1 ||β∗2)⊕H3(T ),
c∗7 = B
z∗i,1+z
∗
i,2ϕ
∗
1 and c∗8 = Bω . It finally issues (c∗5,
c∗6, c∗7, c∗8) to H5 to obtain ϕ∗4, and sets c∗9 = Bϕ
∗
4 . B
outputs C∗2 = (c∗2, c∗3, c∗4, c∗5, c∗6, c∗7, c∗8, c∗9).
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• For updated ciphertext, B sets C∗(up)2 = (c∗2, c∗3, c∗4,
c∗5, c∗6, c∗10) as c∗2 = gt, c∗3 = F (ID∗i )
t, c∗4 = gtϕ
∗
3 ,
c∗5 = c
∗
1 ⊕ (β∗1 ||β∗2), c∗6 = (β∗1 ||β∗2)⊕H3(T ) and c∗10 =
e(g,Bz
∗
i,1+z
∗
i,2ϕ
∗
1 ).
We imply H2(β∗1 , β∗2) =
b
a . If b = b
′, B guesses T =
e(g, g)
b
a ; else, T is a random element in GT .
Phase 2. As in Phase 1 (but with restrictions).
Guess Phase. A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Probabilistic Analysis. The simulations of Hi (i ∈
{1, 4, 5}) are perfect. If A does not either issue (β∗1 , β∗2 )
to H2 or issue T to H3 before the challenge phase, the
simulations of H2 and H3 are perfect. We denote by
AskH∗2 and AskH∗3 the evens that (β∗1 , β∗2 ) has been
issued to H2, and T has been issued to H3, respectively.
The responses to the security device queries, secret key
queries, and the challenge phase are perfect as long as B
does not abort. We let Abort be the event of B aborting
in the responses to the security device queries or in the
challenge phase. Thus, we have Pr[¬Abort] ≥ ϑqsd(1−ϑ),
which is maximized at ϑopt = qsd1+qsd , where qsd is the
total number of security device queries. By using ϑopt,
we have the probability Pr[¬Abort] is at least 1ê(1+qsd) ,
where ê denotes the base of the natural logarithm.
The simulation of ciphertext update queries is perfect
as well unless A is able to issue a valid original cipher-
text without the help of H2. We state that this incident
will occur with probability Pr[CUError] ≤ qcuq , where
qcu is the total number of ciphertext update queries.
The simulation of data recovery queries is perfect
except that B rejects the queries of some valid cipher-
texts. This kind of exception happens when an issued
ciphertext can be constructed without querying H3. We
set valid, AskH2, AskH3 to be the events that a given
ciphertext is valid, (β1, β2) has been issued to H2,
and e(g, g)r has been issued to H3, respectively. From
the simulation, we have Pr[valid|¬AskH3] ≤
qH3
2l
+ 1q ,
and Pr[valid|¬AskH2] ≤
qH2
2l
+ 1q , where qH2 and qH3
are the total numbers of querying H2 and H3, respec-
tively. We let Pr[DRErr] be the probability that the
event valid|(¬AskH2 ∨ ¬AskH3) occurs, then we have
Pr[DRErr] ≤ ( qH2+qH3
2l
+ 2q )qdr, where qdr denotes the
total number of data recovery queries.
Let Bad denote the event that (H∗2 |¬H∗3 ) ∨ H∗3 ∨
CUErr ∨DRErr|¬Abort. We have
ε = |Pr[b = b′]− 1
2
| ≤ 1
2
Pr[Bad]
=
1
2
Pr[(H∗2 |¬H∗3 ) ∨H∗3 ∨ CUErr ∨DRErr|¬Abort]
≤ 1
2Pr[¬Abort] (AskH
∗
3 +
qH2 + (qH2 + qH3)qdr
2l
+
2qdr + qcu
q
).
After organizing the inequality above, we have
AskH∗3 ≥ 2εPr[¬Abort]−
qH2 + (qH2 + qH3)qdr
2l
− 2qdr + qcu
q
≥ 2ε
ê(1 + qsd)
− qH2 + (qH2 + qH3)qdr
2l
− 2qdr + qcu
q
.
Therefore, we have ε′ ≥ 1qH3 (AskH
∗
3 ) ≥ 1qH3 (
2ε
ê(1+qsd)
−
qH2+(qH2+qH3 )qdr
2l
− 2qdr+qcuq ).
The running time of B is bounded by
t′ ≤ t+O(1)(qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qH5 + qsd
+ qsk + qcu + qdr) + te(2qsd + 3qsk
+ qH2(5qcu + 5qdr) + 5qcu + qdr) + 2tpqcu,
where qHi (i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}) denotes the total number of
random oracle Hi queries, and qsk denote the total num-
ber of secret key queries, te and tp denote the running
time of an exponentiation and a pairing, respectively.
For Type-II Security. We allow an adversary to obtain
the security device but not the corresponding secret key.
We analyze the security under the model of Type-II.
Practical Analysis: An adversary A is given the security
device only. We show that it cannot recover the message
by using the device. Complementary to the case of Type-
I adversary, Type-II A can only compute
H3(e(g, c
1
tski,1+tski,2·H1(tpki)
7 ))
= H3(e(g, (tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )
r
tski,1+tski,2H1(tpki) ))
= H3(e(g, g)
r). (4)
Thus, c5 ⊕ (c6 ⊕H3(e(g, g)r)) = (m||φ)⊕H3(e(g1, g2)t).
H3(
e(c2, skIDi,1)
e(c3, skIDi,2)
) = H3(
e(gt, gα2 F (IDi)
s)
e(F (IDi)t, gs)
)
= H3(e(g1, g2)
t). (5)
From the above equations, it can be seen that A can
recover m, if it can make a correct guess on either the
output of H3 or the secret key exponents α and r with
respective probability 1
22k
and 1q2 .
Theoretical Analysis: If an adversary A can recover the
message by a given security device, we can build an
algorithm B to break the BDH assumption.
Setup Phase. B is given an instance of the BDH
problem, i.e. (g, A = ga, B = gb, C = gc, T ), where T
either is random or is equal to e(g, g)abc. In this proof, we
mainly leverages Waters proof technique [46], and reuses
the three functions, F (ID) = (q− 4qskk̄) + x′ +
∑
j∈V xj ,
J(ID) = y′ +
∑
j∈V yj and K(ID) (0, if x
′ +
∑
j∈V xj =
0 mod 4qsk; 1, otherwise) proposed in [46], where qsk is
the number of secret key queries, an integer k̄ ∈R [0, n],−→x = (xj) and−→y = (yj) are two random n-length vectors,
x′ is chosen from [0, 4qsk−1] and y′ ∈R Z∗q . B sets g1 = A,
g2 = B, h = gω , u0 = g
p−k̄4qsk+x′
2 g
y′ and uj = g
xj
2 g
yj ,
where ω ∈R Z∗q . B finally outputs param = (k, q, g, g1,
g2, h, e(g, g), e(g1, g2), H1, H2, H3, H4, H5, F (.)), where
H1, H2, H3, H4 and H5 are chosen as in the real scheme.
• H1 : On receipt of a tpki, if there exists a tuple (tpki,
ϕ1) in the list ListH1 , B returns ϕ1 to A. Otherwise,
B chooses a ϕ1 ∈R Z∗q , returns it to A, and adds
(tpki, ϕ1) to the list ListH1 .
• H2 : On receipt of a tuple (m, φ), if there exists a
tuple (m, φ, ϕ2) in the list ListH2 , B returns ϕ2 to
A. Otherwise, B chooses a ϕ2 ∈R Z∗q , returns it to
A, and adds (m, φ, ϕ2) to the list ListH2 .
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• H3 : On receipt of a R ∈ GT , if there exists a tuple
(R, ξ) in the list ListH3 , B returns ξ to A. Otherwise,
B chooses a ξ ∈R {0, 1}2k, returns it to A, and adds
(R, ξ) to the list ListH3 .
• H4 : On receipt of a tuple (c1, c2, c3), if there exists
a tuple (c1, c2, c3, ϕ3) in the list ListH4 , B returns
gϕ3 to A. Otherwise, B chooses a ϕ3 ∈R Z∗q and
returns gϕ3 to A. B then adds (c1, c2, c3, ϕ3) to the
list ListH4 .
• H5 : On receipt of a tuple (c5, c6, c7, c8), if there
exists a tuple (c5, c6, c7, c8, ϕ4) in the list ListH4 , B
returns gϕ4 . Otherwise, B chooses a ϕ4 ∈R Z∗q , and
returns gϕ4 to A. B then adds (c5, c6, c7, c8, ϕ4) to
the list ListH5 .
Phase 2. A issues the following queries to B.
1) Security Device Queries. A issues an IDi to B. B
generates any security device as in the real scheme.
2) Secret Key Queries. A issues an IDi to B. If
K(ID) = 0, B aborts. Else, B chooses an s ∈R
Z∗q , and constructs skIDi as (g
−J(ID)
F (ID)
1 (u0
∏
j∈V uj)
s,
g
−1
F (ID)
1 g
s).
3) Ciphertext Update Queries. A issues a tuple (C2,
tpki) to B for querying an update ciphertext C(up)2
under (IDi, tpkj). B first checks whether there are
tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list ListH2 so that
c2 = g
t, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t, c7 = (tpki,1·tpkH1(tpki)i,2 )r,
c8 = h
r and c9 = H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)r. If no, output ⊥;
else proceed. B can generate any update ciphertext
for A as it can generate any security device.
4) Data Recovery Queries.
• For ciphertext C2, B first checks whether there
are tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list ListH2
so that c2 = gt, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t, c7 = (tpki,1 ·
tpk
H1(tpki)
i,2 )
r, c8 = hr and c9 = H5(c5, c6, c7, c8)r.
If no, B outputs ⊥. Otherwise, B recovers tuples
(R1 = e(g1, g2)t, ξ1) and (R2 = e(g, g)r, ξ2) from
the list ListH3 , and computes m||φ = (c5⊕ (c6⊕
ξ2))⊕ ξ1.
• For ciphertext C(up)2 , B first checks whether
there are tuples (m, φ, t), (β1, β2, r) in the list
ListH2 so that c2 = gt, c4 = H4(c1, c2, c3)t and
c10 = e(g
r, tpki,1 · tpkH1(tpki)i,2 ). If no, B outputs
⊥. Otherwise, B recovers tuples (R1 = e(g1, g2)t,
ξ1) and (R2 = e(g, g)r, ξ2) from the list ListH3 ,
and computes m||φ = (c5 ⊕ (c6 ⊕ ξ2))⊕ ξ1.
Challenge Phase. A outputs m0,m1 and (ID∗i , tpk∗i )
to B. If x′+
∑
j∈V xj 6= 4k̄qsk, B aborts. Else, B proceeds.
• For original ciphertext, B chooses β∗1 , β∗2 , φ∗ ∈R
{0, 1}k and b ∈R {0, 1}. It sets c∗1 = (mb||φ∗)⊕H3(T ),
c∗2 = C, c∗3 = CJ(ID
∗
i ), c∗4 = Cϕ3 . B further is-
sues (β∗1 , β∗2 ) to H2 to obtain r (i.e. ϕ2), and sets
c∗5 = c
∗
1 ⊕ (β∗1 ||β∗2), c∗6 = (β∗1 ||β∗2) ⊕ H3(e(g, g)r),
c∗7 = (tpk
∗
i,1tpk
∗H1(tpk∗i )
i,2 )
r and c∗8 = gωr. It finally
issues (c∗5, c∗6, c∗7, c∗8) to H5 to obtain ϕ∗4, and sets
c∗9 = g
ϕ∗4 . B outputs C∗2 = (c∗2, c∗3, c∗4, c∗5, c∗6, c∗7, c∗8, c∗9).
• For updated ciphertext, B sets C∗(up)2 = (c∗2, c∗3, c∗4,
c∗5, c∗6, c∗10) as c∗2 = C, c∗3 = CJ(ID
∗
i ), c∗4 = Cϕ3 ,
c∗5 = (mb||φ∗) ⊕ H3(T ) ⊕ (β∗1 ||β∗2), c∗6 = (β∗1 ||β∗2) ⊕
H3(e(g, g)
r) and c∗10 = e(gr, tpk∗i,1tpk
∗H1(tpk∗i )
i,2 ).
The above ciphertexts imply H2(mb, φ∗) = c. If b =
b′, B guesses T = e(g, g)abc; else, T is a random
element in GT .
Phase 2. Same as Phase 1 (but with restrictions).
Guess Phase. A outputs a guess bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}.
Probabilistic Analysis: We analyze the probability by us-
ing the same method presented in the security analysis of
Type-I adversary. Combining the non-abort probability
in [46], we have ε′ ≥ 1qH3 (AskH
∗
3 ) ≥ 1qH3 (
2ε
8(n+1)qsk
−
qH2+(qH2+qH3 )qdr
2l
− 2qdr+qcuq ).
The running time of B is bounded by
t′ ≤ t+O(1)(qH1 + qH2 + qH3 + qH4 + qH5 + qsd
+ qsk + qcu + qdr) + te(2qsd + 4qsk
+ qH2(5qcu + 5qdr) + 5qcu + qdr) + 2tpqcu.
5.2 Efficiency Analysis
We analyze the efficiency of our mechanism as well as
its comparison with [2] (the most efficient two-secret
protection system but no revocability) and [20] (the most
efficient single secret system with revocability) in terms
of computational and communicational cost. We state
that both [2] and [20] only achieve partial design goal of
our system. The purpose of the comparison is to show
that our system achieves more functionalities but not
requiring a great increase of complexity. In other words,
we would like to show our system is practical for real-
world implementation.
Before the efficiency analysis, we define the notations
we used in tables. We let |G| and |GT | denote the bit-
length of an element in groups G and GT , l denote
the bit-length of security parameter, |Zq| denote the bit-
length of an element in Zq , Cp, Cē, Ce denote the compu-
tation cost of a bilinear pairing, an exponentiation in GT ,
and an exponentiation in G, respectively. We suppose the
three schemes share the same security parameter. Note
by ⊥ we mean non-applicable.
Theoretical Comparison. We present the theoretical com-
parison in Table 2 and Table 3 for computation and
communication complexity, respectively. From Table 2,
it can be seen that our system requires additional com-
putation cost in security device generation and update,
whereas others do not need any cost. This is because
ours supports security device revocability. In ciphertext
generation, our system does not require any pairings
operation, and it is worth of mentioning that the 2nd
level ciphertext generation cost can be offloaded to a
cloud server. Compared to [20] for other metrics, our
system only requires slight extra cost; while we just need
an additional pairing in ciphertext update. A similar
phenomenon does exist in Table 3 in the sense that
our system needs extra communication cost in delivery
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TABLE 2: Computation Comparison I
Schemes [2] [20] Ours
Secret Key Generation 2Ce Ce 2Ce
Security Device Generation ⊥ ⊥ 2Ce
Ciphertext Generation Ce + Cē + 3Cp 4Ce + Cp 1st-level Ciph.: 3Ce + Cē
2nd-level Ciph.: 4Ce + Cē
Ciphertext Update ⊥ 2Ce + 5Cp 5Ce + 6Cp
Device Update ⊥ ⊥ 2Ce
Data Recovery (From Original Ciph.) Ce + Cp 4Ce + 2Cp 8Ce + 2Cp
Data Recovery (From Updated Ciph.) ⊥ Ce + 2Cp 7Ce + Cē + 2Cp
TABLE 3: Communication Comparison I
Schemes [2] [20] Ours
Secret Key Size |G| |G| 2|G|
Security Device Size ⊥ ⊥ 2|G|+ 2|Zq |
Original Ciphertext Size |G|+ 2l 2|G|+ |GT |+ l 6|G|+ 4l
Updated Ciphertext Size ⊥ |G|+ |GT |+ 2l 3|G|+ |GT |+ 4l
Cost in Ciphertext Update ⊥ |G|+ l 2|G|
of security device. Except for this, our communication
complexity is very closed to that of others.
Practical Comparison. For real-time complexity test, we
set the testbed to be: Pentium (R) G640 CPU, 3.33
GB RAM, 500 G/5400 rpm hard disk, C programming
language, and Ubuntu 10.10 OS; pairing type is a with
160-bit group order (using a supersingular curve Y 2 =
X3+X). In the experiment, to achieve the corresponding
security level, we set l to be 160 bits, |Zq| = 160 bits,
|G| = 160 bits and |GT | = 1024 bits, respectively.
We show the running time comparison and practical
communication comparison in Table 4 and Table 5, re-
spectively. The experimental results are somehow similar
to the theoretical ones. Our system needs extra running
time in device generation and update. In practice, if we
make security device as a USB disk and deliver it to a
registered user by mail/in person, there is no need for
paying the price for communication cost in the metrics of
“Security Device Size” and “Cost in Ciphertext Update”.
From Table 4, we see that our running time is nearly
the same as that of [20], and meanwhile, our system
outperforms [20] and [2] in encryption. In the commu-
nication cost, our scheme suffers from the largest price
in “Updated Ciphertext Size” due to a reason that the
scheme outputs a pairing in the update phase. However,
we state that the price is only an approximately 50%
increase from that of [20] in the same metric, which is
an acceptable increment.
In summary, through the comparison, we can see that
our scheme achieves two factors protection and security
device revocability without requiring a great amount of
additional complexity.
6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we introduced a novel two-factor data se-
curity protection mechanism for cloud storage system, in
which a data sender is allowed to encrypt the data with
knowledge of the identity of a receiver only, while the
receiver is required to use both his/her secret key and a
security device to gain access to the data. Our solution
not only enhances the confidentiality of the data, but
also offers the revocability of the device so that once the
device is revoked, the corresponding ciphertext will be
updated automatically by the cloud server without any
notice of the data owner. Furthermore, we presented the
security proof and efficiency analysis for our system.
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